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PEOPLE V. BUZA: A STEP IN THE WRONG 
DIRECTION 
Emily R. Pincin* 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
The use of deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) in criminal 
investigations is a relatively recent development.1 Originally, DNA 
profiling was developed as a means to establish paternity.2 DNA 
profiling only made its way into criminal courts in 1986, when a 
molecular biologist used DNA evidence to prove that a teenager was 
not in fact the perpetrator of two murders.3 In 1987, a Florida rapist 
became the first person in the United States to be convicted as a result 
of DNA evidence.4 
Now, forensic DNA is used increasingly as a crime-solving 
weapon.5 For example, in 2018, California law enforcement officials 
arrested the notorious Golden State Killer, i.e., Joseph James 
DeAngelo, who was responsible for a series of rapes and burglaries in 
the 1970s and 1980s.6 Authorities were able to track down DeAngelo 
by creatively providing his DNA (which was left at old crime scenes) 
to the free, open-source DNA analysis company GEDmatch, which 
confirmed a DNA match to a family member that had previously 
 
 * J.D. Candidate, May 2020, Loyola Law School, Los Angeles. Thank you to Professor 
Kevin D. Lapp for graciously providing his time and expertise. Thank you to Loyola of Los Angeles 
Law Review for your indispensable edits and suggestions. 
 1. See Kathryn Zunno, United States v. Kincade and the Constitutionality of the Federal 
DNA Act: Why We’ll Need a New Pair of Genes to Wear Down the Slippery Slope, 79 ST. JOHN’S 
L. REV. 769, 769–70 (2005). 
 2. Lisa Calandro et al., Evolution of DNA Evidence for Crime Solving – A Judicial and 
Legislative History, FORENSIC MAG. (Jan. 6, 2005, 3:00 AM), 
https://www.forensicmag.com/article/2005/01/evolution-dna-evidence-crime-solving-judicial-
and-legislative-history. 
 3. Id. 
 4. Randy James, A Brief History of DNA Testing, TIME (June 19, 2009), 
http://content.time.com/time/nation/article/0,8599,1905706,00.html. 
 5. Id. 
 6. Thomas Fuller & Christine Hauser, Search for ‘Golden State Killer’ Leads to Arrest of 
Ex-Cop, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 25, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/04/25/us/golden-state-killer-
serial.html. 
(12) 53.2_PINCIN (DO NOT DELETE) 6/5/2020  1:35 PM 
522 LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW [Vol. 53:521 
submitted his or her DNA for genetic testing.7 This is not the first time 
police were able to track down a criminal with the creative use of an 
individual’s DNA.8 
As the use of DNA in investigations continues to grow, so does 
the number of ethical and legal controversies. One such controversy is 
whether laws requiring the collection of DNA from every person 
arrested for a felony (and some misdemeanors) is lawful under either 
the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution or under a 
respective state’s constitution. 
Article I, section 13 of the California Constitution guarantees the 
“right of the people to be secure . . . against unreasonable searches and 
seizures.”9 The constitutional right to privacy is a cornerstone in both 
the Federal and California Constitutions. The right to privacy has 
historically been the focal point in the debate over how the state should 
balance the security of the people with individual civil liberty. In order 
to bolster California’s goal to increase state security and substantially 
reduce the number of unsolved crimes, the electorate included 
Proposition 69 (the DNA Fingerprint, Unsolved Crime, and Innocence 
Protection Act) on the November 2, 2004, general election ballot.10 
In 2004, California voters passed Proposition 69, often referred 
to as the “DNA Fingerprint, Unsolved Crime and Innocence 
Protection Act” (the “DNA Act” or the “Act”).11 Prior to the passage 
of the DNA Act, California law allowed for DNA collection from only 
convicted felons.12 The DNA Act allows for collection of DNA 
samples of anyone arrested (for a non-exhaustive list of crimes), even 
if that individual is wrongfully arrested or among the thousands of 
 
 7. Avi Selk, The Ingenious and “Dystopian” DNA Technique Police Used to Hunt the 
“Golden State Killer” Suspect, WASH. POST, (Apr. 28, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/ 
news/true-crime/wp/2018/04/27/golden-state-killer-dna-website-gedmatch-was-used-to-identify-
joseph-deangelo-as-suspect-police-say/?noredirect=on&utm_term=.8b2710ec48d9. 
 8. In 2005, police arrested the Kansas-based killer, “BTK,” after successfully obtaining a 
familial DNA match from a tissue sample from a Pap smear recently performed on his daughter. 
Mark Hansen, How the Cops Caught BTK: Playing to a Serial Killer’s Ego Helped Crack the Case, 
A.B.A. J. (May 1, 2006), http://www.abajournal.com/magazine/article/how_the_cops_caught_btk. 
 9. CAL. CONST. art. I, § 13. 
 10. DNA Samples. Collection. Database. Funding., U.C. HASTINGS SCHOLARSHIP 
REPOSITORY 9 (2004), https://repository.uchastings.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2230& 
context=ca_ballot_props. 
 11. The DNA Act was approved by 62 percent of voters and took effect in 2009. Proposition 
69, INST. OF GOVERNMENTAL STUD., U.C. BERKELEY, (Nov. 2, 2004), 
https://igs.berkeley.edu/library/elections/proposition-69; Proposition 69 (DNA), ST. OF CAL. 
DEP’T OF JUST., https://oag.ca.gov/bfs/prop69 (last visited Nov. 17, 2019). 
 12. DNA Samples. Collection. Database. Funding., supra note 10, at 62. 
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people that are arrested every year and never charged with a crime.13 
Further, the Act allows for an arrestee’s DNA to be submitted to the 
state DNA database and analyzed before the arrestee is convicted or 
even charged with a crime.14 
Proponents of the DNA Act rely on the argument that the Act 
protects the innocent, helps solve crime, and frees those wrongly 
accused.15 Courts have upheld the constitutionality of similar DNA 
collection statues on the grounds that the law is intended to be used 
for the purpose of identifying arrestees upon booking and is thus 
constitutional.16 Nevertheless, the very first subsection under 
Proposition 69’s Declaration of Purpose reads, “Our communities 
have a compelling interest in protecting themselves from crime.”17 
Based upon the language of this subsection, opponents of the Act 
opine that the Act was not designed for the purpose of quickly and 
efficiently identifying arrestees but for crime-solving purposes by 
extracting DNA without a warrant or individualized suspicion.18 
Recently, the California Supreme Court weighed in on 
California’s DNA Act in People v. Buza.19 On April 2, 2018, the court 
affirmed Buza’s misdemeanor conviction for refusing to provide a 
DNA sample when he was arrested for felony arson.20 At the time 
Buza refused to provide a cheek swab, he had neither been found 
guilty of a crime, nor had a magistrate judge determined that there had 
been probable cause for his arrest.21 It is well established that, at the 
time of Buza’s arrest, he was presumed innocent in the eyes of the law; 
however, the DNA Act required Buza to submit a cheek swab prior to 
being charged or convicted. 
In a 4-3 decision, the California Supreme Court upheld 
California’s DNA Act under both the Fourth Amendment to the 
United States Constitution and the California Constitution.22 The Buza 
 
 13. Id. 
 14. Id. at 61. 
 15. Id. at 9. 
 16. See, e.g., Maryland v. King, 569 U.S. 435, 465–66 (2013). 
 17. CAL. SEC’Y OF STATE, Text of Proposed Laws, 135 https://oag.ca.gov/sites/all/files/ 
agweb/pdfs/bfs/sec_state_full_version_prop69.pdf. Based upon the plain language of the proposed 
proposition, it is clear that the true legislative purpose of this initiative is crime-solving, not for 
identifying arrestees. 
 18. DNA Samples. Collection. Database. Funding., supra note 10, at 62–63. 
 19. 413 P.3d 1132, 1135 (Cal. 2018). 
 20. Id. at 1155. 
 21. See id. 
 22. Id. 
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majority missed a rare opportunity to reassert the independence and 
importance of California’s Constitution, which is discussed at length 
in both Justice Liu’s and Justice Cuéllar’s dissents. As discussed 
below, the California Constitution protects individual rights beyond 
the bounds of the United States Constitution. By failing to reassert the 
independent force of California’s Constitution, which affords arrestees 
greater rights than those provided by the United States Constitution, 
the Buza majority took a step in the wrong direction for criminal 
procedural rights. This decision signals an uphill battle to restore 
precedent that appropriately reflects the core values of the California 
Constitution. 
II.  STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A.  The Facts 
On January 21, 2009, a San Francisco police officer saw Mark 
Buza running away from a police car that had burning tires.23 The 
police pursued Buza and, upon searching him, found matches in his 
pocket and a container of oil in his backpack.24 Close to where Buza 
had been hiding, police also discovered a road flare and a bottle 
containing what smelled like gasoline.25 
The police arrested Buza and took him to county jail.26 Several 
hours after Buza’s arrest, a sheriff’s deputy asked Buza to swab the 
inside of his cheek to obtain a DNA sample.27 The deputy informed 
Buza that he was required by law to provide the sample and warned 
Buza that refusal to provide the sample would result in a misdemeanor 
charge.28 Defendant nevertheless refused.29 
The day after Buza’s arrest, a superior court judge found probable 
cause to support a valid arrest for felony arson.30 The following day, 
the district attorney filed a complaint charging Buza with felony arson, 
as well as with misdemeanor refusal to provide a DNA specimen.31 
 
 23. Id. at 1137. 
 24. Id. 
 25. Id. 
 26. Id. 
 27. Id. 
 28. Id. 
 29. Id. 
 30. Id. 
 31. Id. 
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Buza was eventually tried by a jury.32 Buza moved for a judgment of 
acquittal on the misdemeanor refusal charge on the grounds that the 
Fourth Amendment does not allow for forced DNA swabs from 
arrestees.33 The court denied Buza’s motion, and the jury convicted 
him of all charges.34 
Upon Buza’s sentencing, the court ordered him to provide a DNA 
sample, and Buza again refused.35 The court thereafter authorized the 
sheriff’s department to use reasonable force to obtain Buza’s DNA 
sample.36 Buza subsequently complied with the order to supply the 
sample and was sentenced to a prison term of over sixteen months.37 
B.  Case Procedure 
On appeal, the California Court of Appeal reversed Buza’s 
misdemeanor conviction and held: 
[T]he DNA Act, to the extent it requires felony arrestees to 
submit a DNA sample for law enforcement analysis and 
inclusion in the state and federal DNA databases, without 
independent suspicion, a warrant or even a judicial or grand 
jury determination of probable cause, unreasonably intrudes 
on such arrestees’ expectation of privacy and is invalid under 
the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution.38 
On September 7, 2011, the California Attorney General filed a 
petition for review by the California Supreme Court and presented the 
question of whether the collection of forensic DNA samples from 
felony arrestees violates the Fourth Amendment to the United States 
Constitution.39 The Attorney General’s argument that review should 
be granted essentially proceeded as follows: the California Court of 
Appeal opinion: (1) invalidated a state voter initiative proposition; (2) 
jeopardized public safety; (3) conflicted with the reasoning of state 
and federal cases nationwide upholding DNA sample collection from 
both arrestees and convicted offenders; and (4) was at odds with the 
 
 32. Id. 
 33. Id. 
 34. Id. 
 35. Id. at 1137–38. 
 36. Id. 
 37. Id. at 1138. 
 38. People v. Buza, 129 Cal. Rptr. 3d 753, 783 (Ct. App. 2011), review granted and opinion 
superseded by 262 P.3d 854 (Cal. 2011). 
 39. Petition for Review at 1, People v. Buza, 262 P.3d 854 (Cal. 2011) (No. S196200), 2011 
WL 5073104, at *1. 
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legislative judgments of twenty-four states and Congress, which have 
enacted laws authorizing collection of DNA samples from some 
categories of arrestees.40 
The California Supreme Court granted review.41 While Buza’s 
case was pending before the California Supreme Court, the United 
States Supreme Court decided Maryland v. King42 (discussed in more 
detail below), upholding a similar DNA collection procedure in 
Maryland.43 Following the Supreme Court’s decision in King, the 
California Supreme Court transferred Buza’s case back to the 
California Court of Appeal for reconsideration.44 
The California Court of Appeal again reversed Buza’s 
misdemeanor conviction, this time on the grounds that the forced 
DNA swab violated Buza’s right to be free from unreasonable 
searches and seizures under article I, section 13 of the California 
Constitution.45 The California Court of Appeal declined to decide 
whether the California DNA Act and the Maryland law were 
significantly different to warrant a separate Fourth Amendment 
analysis than that applied by the Court in King.46 
The California Supreme Court again granted review, this time to 
decide whether the collection and analysis of forensic identification 
DNA samples from felony arrestees violates either article I, section 13 
of the California Constitution or the Fourth Amendment to the United 
States Constitution.47 In a sharply-divided, 4-3 decision, the California 
Supreme Court upheld California’s DNA Act under both the United 
Sates and California Constitutions.48 
 
 40. Id. at *2. 
 41. Buza, 413 P.3d at 1138. 
 42. 569 U.S. 435 (2013). 
 43. See generally id. (holding that using buccal swabs to obtain defendant’s DNA sample after 
arrest and analyzing that sample did not violate the Fourth Amendment). 
 44. Buza, 413 P.3d at 1138. 
 45. People v. Buza, 180 Cal. Rptr. 3d 753, 795–96 (Ct. App. 2014), rev’d, 413 P.3d 1132 (Cal. 
2018). 
 46. Id. at 767. 
 47. Buza, 413 P.3d at 1138. 
 48. See generally id. at 1135, 1155. 
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III.  REASONING OF THE COURT 
A.  The Majority 
Buza made a number of points in support of his argument that his 
misdemeanor conviction should be overturned. Buza argued that 
California’s DNA Act differed from the Maryland collection law 
discussed in Maryland v. King, such that these differences should 
change the DNA Act’s constitutional analysis under both the Fourth 
Amendment and the California Constitution.49 For instance, the 
California DNA Act applies to a broader category of arrestees than the 
Maryland law.50 Additionally, in California, collection and analysis of 
arrestee DNA samples is permitted before the arrest is deemed valid 
by a judicial determination.51 Further, under the California law, DNA 
samples from exonerated arrestees (or arrestees that are never charged 
or convicted) are not automatically destroyed.52 Finally, Buza argued 
that the Court in King misidentified the “legitimate” government 
interest of Maryland’s DNA collection law and therefore incorrectly 
upheld the law.53 
The majority’s holding relied mostly on the United States 
Supreme Court’s ruling in Maryland v. King.54 Indeed, Justice 
Kreuger, the author of the Buza majority, noted that “King, which was 
issued while this appeal was pending, has significantly altered the 
terms of the debate” about whether the Fourth Amendment 
categorically forbids the mandatory collection of DNA from persons 
who have been arrested for, but not yet convicted of, felony offenses.55 
A brief discussion of King is therefore warranted. 
1.  Maryland v. King 
In King, defendant Alonzo Jay King, Jr. was arrested on first- and 
second-degree assault charges.56 After King was arrested, but prior to 
conviction, his cheek was swabbed, and his DNA was logged into 
 
 49. Id. at 1141, 1143. 
 50. Id. at 1141. 
 51. Id. 
 52. Id. 
 53. See Appellant’s Answer Brief on the Merits at 52, People v. Buza, 413 P.3d 1132 (Cal. 
2015) (No. S223698), 2015 WL 5090233, at *52. 
 54. Buza, 413 P.3d at 1141, 1153. 
 55. Id. at 1139. 
 56. Maryland v. King, 569 U.S. 435, 440 (2013). 
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Maryland’s DNA database.57 When King’s DNA was later analyzed 
after his arraignment, the database returned a “hit” linking King’s 
DNA to a DNA sample taken from a rape cold case.58 This evidence 
was presented to a grand jury, which called for an indictment.59 As a 
result, a warrant was procured to obtain a second DNA sample that 
could be used as evidence in the rape case against King.60 King filed 
a motion to suppress the DNA evidence on the grounds that it 
infringed upon his Fourth Amendment rights.61 
The United States Supreme Court decision was close, but the 
result was a 5-4 ruling in favor of the State of Maryland.62 The 
majority described Maryland’s DNA law as follows: “The Act 
authorizes Maryland law enforcement authorities to collect DNA 
samples [in the form of a buccal cheek swab] from ‘an individual who 
is charged with . . . a crime of violence or an attempt to commit a crime 
of violence; or . . . burglary or an attempt to commit burglary.’”63 The 
Court found that the Maryland law did not violate the Fourth 
Amendment to the United States Constitution.64 
The Court recognized that, though taking a cheek swab from an 
arrestee does constitute a “search” under the Fourth Amendment, such 
a search is reasonable because: (1) arrestees in custody for a crime 
supported by probable cause have a diminished expectation of 
privacy; (2) the swab involved minimal intrusion and is quick and 
painless; and (3) a legitimate government interest is served.65 Writing 
for the majority, Justice Kennedy found that the government’s interest 
in identifying and processing arrestees weighed strongly in favor of 
collecting DNA samples.66 
The scathing dissent, written by the late Justice Antonin Scalia 
and joined by Justices Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Sonia Sotomayor, and 
Elena Kagan, maintained that “categorically” and “without 
 
 57. Id. at 441. 
 58. Id. 
 59. Id. 
 60. Id. 
 61. Id. The court denied his motion, but the Maryland Court of Appeals reversed. Id. The state 
of Maryland then appealed the ruling and requested that the issue be reviewed by the United States 
Supreme Court. Id. at 442. 
 62. See id. at 438. 
 63. Id. at 443 (alteration in original). 
 64. Id. at 465–66. 
 65. See id. at 465. 
 66. Id. at 449. 
(12) 53.2_PINCIN (DO NOT DELETE) 6/5/2020  1:35 PM 
2020] A STEP IN THE WRONG DIRECTION 529 
exception,” the “Fourth Amendment forbids searching a person for 
evidence of a crime where there is no basis for believing the person is 
guilty of the crime or is in possession of incriminating evidence.”67 
Justice Scalia even read his dissent from the bench, “signaling deep 
disagreement” with the majority’s decision.68 In response to the 
majority’s argument that the cheek swab search is non-invasive, 
Justice Scalia noted, “No matter the degree of invasiveness, 
suspicionless searches are never allowed if their principal end is 
ordinary crime-solving.”69 
Additionally, the dissent called out the majority’s argument that 
the Maryland law is reasonable because it served the special purpose 
of “identifying” arrestees.70 The dissent rebutted that assertion and 
argued that “identification” was not the true goal of the Maryland law; 
instead, the purpose was to “search[] for evidence that [the arrestee] 
committed crimes unrelated to the crime of his arrest.”71 Further, 
King’s DNA was not tested until he was arraigned, days after his 
arrest, because Maryland law forbids officials from doing so.72 The 
dissent pointed out that officials likely did not wait until King’s 
arraignment to ask him his name or take his fingerprints.73 
Accordingly, Maryland’s law could not logically be understood 
merely as an “identification” tool. 
2.  The Differences Between California’s DNA Act and  
Maryland’s DNA Collection Law Do Not Change  
the Fourth Amendment Analysis 
The Buza majority, whose opinion was written by Justice Kruger, 
held that California’s DNA Act violates neither the United States 
Constitution nor the California Constitution. 
As previously mentioned, Buza highlighted three features of 
California’s DNA Act that distinguished his case from King: (1) the 
DNA Act applies to a broader category of arrestees than the Maryland 
law; (2) the DNA Act authorizes both collection and testing of DNA 
 
 67. Id. at 466 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 68. Adam Liptak, Justices Allow DNA Collection After an Arrest, N.Y. TIMES (June 3, 2013), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2013/06/04/us/supreme-court-says-police-can-take-dna-samples.html. 
 69. King, 569 U.S. at 469. 
 70. Id. at 469–70. 
 71. Id. at 470. 
 72. See id. at 471; see also MD. CODE ANN., PUB. SAFETY § 2-504(d)(1) (West 2019). 
 73. King, 569 U.S. at 471. 
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samples before a judicial determination has been made that an 
arrestee’s charges are valid; and (3) the DNA Act does not provide for 
automatic destruction of the DNA sample if the arrestee is cleared of 
felony charges.74 
The California Supreme Court addressed each of these 
differences in turn. The court first addressed the scope of the DNA 
Act’s collection requirement.75 The court disregarded the first 
difference identified by Buza and held that he cannot reasonably 
“attack a statute on grounds that are not shown to be applicable to 
himself.”76 Because Buza was arrested for a “serious felony” (arson), 
he could not attack California’s DNA Act based on its potential 
application to other, differently-situated individuals.77 
Next, the court addressed Buza’s concern that California’s DNA 
Act, unlike Maryland’s law, allows officials to load an arrestee’s DNA 
sample into a state-wide database and analyze it before the arrestee 
has been arraigned or before there has been a judicial determination 
that the arrest was valid.78 The court determined that any differences 
between the California law and the Maryland law regarding the timing 
of the collection of DNA would not change the constitutional analysis 
in this case because DNA collection upon booking is a “legitimate 
police booking procedure.”79 
Nevertheless, Buza argued that it was the second step (the testing 
and recording of his DNA) that represented a great privacy intrusion.80 
The court observed that the reasoning of the majority in King did not 
lend support to Buza’s argument that the analysis and recording of his 
DNA should be delayed until a probable cause finding has been 
made.81 Buza argued that there would be no burden on law 
enforcement to delay such testing and recording until a probable cause 
determination had been made since it takes, on average, approximately 
 
 74. People v. Buza, 413 P.3d 1132, 1141 (Cal. 2018). 
 75. Id. 
 76. Id. at 1142 (quoting In re Cregler, 363 P.2d 305, 308 (Cal. 1961)). 
 77. See id. at 1142. 
 78. Id. at 1142–43. 
 79. Id. at 1143. Nevertheless, California’s DNA Act allows for collection of DNA 
“immediately following arrest.” Id. (“As to the timing of collection, there is no reason to believe 
that the differences between California’s law and Maryland’s change the Fourth Amendment 
balance applicable in this case.”). 
 80. Id. 
 81. Id. 
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thirty days to generate an identification profile from an arrestee’s 
DNA sample.82 
The court eventually concluded that it “[could not] proceed on the 
assumption that a rule delaying the collection or processing of samples 
until after a judicial probable cause finding or arraignment would pose 
no meaningful risk of interference with the central interest identified 
in King: the accurate identification of arrestees who are taken into 
police custody.”83 
Finally, the court acknowledged Buza’s concern that some 
arrestees who provide DNA samples may never be charged with a 
crime or—if charged—convicted.84 Buza contended that California’s 
DNA Act allows the state to retain an arrestee’s DNA sample and 
associated records for an extended period of time and argued, 
essentially, that the DNA Act’s expungement provisions are 
insufficient.85 Regardless, the court deferred to the King ruling, where 
the majority attached no significance to Maryland’s expungement 
procedures in the constitutional analysis.86 The court refused to 
address the question of whether the Fourth Amendment requires 
automatic expungement of DNA samples for those that are exonerated 
or wrongfully arrested “because defendant in this case [was] 
neither.”87 
In sum, the court found that any differences between California’s 
and Maryland’s DNA collection laws did not affect the Fourth 
Amendment analysis, and as such, Buza’s misdemeanor refusal 
conviction did not violate his federal constitutional rights.88 
3.  The DNA Act Does Not Violate the California Constitution 
Buza also argued, and the California Court of Appeal held, that 
even if requiring him to furnish a DNA sample as part of his arrest 
booking procedure did not violate his Fourth Amendment rights, it 
violated article I, section 13 of the California Constitution, which 
affords arrestees greater rights than those provided by the United 
 
 82. Id. at 1144. 
 83. Id. 
 84. Id. at 1145. 
 85. See id. at 1146. 
 86. Id. 
 87. Id. 
 88. Id. at 1148. 
(12) 53.2_PINCIN (DO NOT DELETE) 6/5/2020  1:35 PM 
532 LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW [Vol. 53:521 
States Constitution.89 The California Supreme Court reviewed the 
constitutionality of the search under the California Constitution by 
weighing the gravity of the governmental interest or public concern 
served against the degree to which the government conduct interferes 
with individual liberty.90 
The court thus presented the question of whether adequate 
reasons existed to conclude, despite the high court’s ruling in King, 
that California voters exceeded constitutional bounds in mandating the 
collection of a DNA sample from arrestees.91 Buza argued that there 
were several reasons to depart from the Supreme Court’s ruling in 
King. Buza asserted that the Supreme Court’s balancing test in King 
was flawed because the “legitimate governmental interest” was 
misidentified.92 Though the King Court concluded that collecting 
DNA from people arrested for serious offenses serves the “legitimate 
governmental interest” in safely and accurately identifying the person 
in custody, Buza argued that arrestee DNA information is not used for 
identification purposes, but solely for investigation of possible other 
crimes.93 Much like Justice Scalia’s dissent in King, Buza’s argument 
was that gathering information for such a purpose is unreasonable in 
the absence of a warrant or individualized suspicion.94 
The court briefly acknowledged Buza’s argument that DNA 
samples could be misused for investigative purposes; nevertheless, the 
court cited and deferred to its earlier decision in People v. Robinson,95 
where the court held that DNA collection from those convicted of 
dangerous felonies was constitutional because of its ability to 
accurately identify criminal offenders.96 The court reminded Buza that 
DNA samples, such as cheek swabs, function as an identification tool 
in the same way as fingerprinting, which has been upheld as 
reasonable.97 
 
 89. Id. 
 90. See id. (citing Hill v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n., 865 P.2d 633, 650 (1994)). 
 91. Id. at 1150. 
 92. See Appellant’s Answer Brief on the Merits, supra note 53, at 88. 
 93. Id. 
 94. Buza, 413 P.3d at 1150. 
 95.  People v. Robinson, 224 P.3d 55 (Cal. 2010). 
 96. Buza, 413 P.3d at 1150–51 (citing Robinson, 224 P.3d at 65). The court cited to this case 
to support the constitutionality of the DNA Act, despite the significance in the difference of 
circumstances between Robinson and Buza’s case. 
 97. Id. at 1151 (citing Maryland v. King, 569 U.S. 435, 451 (2013)). 
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The court rejected Buza’s claim that King ignored the highly 
sensitive nature of genetic data revealed by an individual’s DNA.98 
The court argued that DNA profiles are created by the non-coding 
sections of DNA and thus do not reveal any sensitive genetic data.99 
Further, the court acknowledged that the DNA Act forbids the use of 
DNA information for nonidentification purposes and, thus, does not 
implicate a privacy interest.100 
Finally, in addressing Buza’s argument that article I, section 13 
of the California Constitution gives arrestees greater privacy rights 
than those afforded under the Fourth Amendment, the court offered a 
lengthy “reaffirmation” about the deference and respect that should be 
provided to decisions of the high court.101 The court recognized that 
state constitutional law is independent from federal constitutional law 
and that decisions of the United States Supreme Court interpreting 
parallel federal text are not binding.102 Nonetheless, the court said that 
“this court ordinarily resolve[s] questions about the legality of 
searches and seizures by construing the Fourth Amendment and article 
I, section 13 in tandem.”103 
The court held, “[T]he United States Supreme Court has resolved 
the question before us under the Fourth Amendment.”104 Buza’s 
attempt to argue that the differences between the DNA Act and the 
law at issue in King should alter the state constitutional analysis was 
futile.105 For reasons noted above, the court refused to reassess the 
constitutionality of the DNA Act as it applied to Buza’s case.106 
Because the court found no reasons to justify rejecting the Supreme 
Court’s guidance, Buza’s misdemeanor conviction was upheld under 
the California Constitution.107 
 
 98. Id. at 1152. 
 99. Id. 
 100. Id. 
 101. See id. at 1148–49. 
 102. Id. at 1148. 
 103. Id. at 1149. 
 104. Id. at 1150. 
 105. Id. at 1151. 
 106. Id. at 1135, 1149 (“[T]his court ordinarily resolve[s] questions about the legality of 
searches and seizure by construing the Fourth Amendment and article I, section 13 in tandem.”). 
 107. Id. 
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B.  The Liu Dissent 
Justice Goodwin Liu wrote the first dissent, stating that the DNA 
Act should not require an arrest to be judicially validated before an 
arrestee is required to provide a DNA sample.108 Justice Liu further 
argued that the Act’s failure to provide for automatic expungement of 
DNA samples of individuals who were exonerated, acquitted, or not 
even charged is “troubling” for both practical reasons and 
constitutional reasons.109 
Finally, Justice Liu argued that the majority failed to respect the 
independence of California’s Constitution by adopting essentially a 
rebuttable “presumption of correctness.”110 Justice Liu rejected the 
majority’s approach and, instead, asked, “whether we should reject the 
high court’s Fourth Amendment guidance.”111 Humbly citing his own 
law review article, Justice Liu discussed the importance of judicial 
federalism and the importance of interpreting the guarantees of 
California’s Constitution without according a presumption of 
correctness to high court precedent.112 
Justice Liu concluded that Buza’s conviction for refusing to 
comply with the DNA Act was invalid under the California 
Constitution.113 He did not reach the question of whether Buza’s 
conviction would also be invalid under the Fourth Amendment.114 
C.  The Cuéllar Dissent 
Justice Mariano-Florentino Cuéllar wrote the second, sixteen-
page dissent and was joined by Justice Dennis Perluss.115 Justice 
Cuéllar’s dissent expressed agreement with Justice Liu’s remarks and 
 
 108. Id. at 1156 (Liu, J., dissenting). Justice Liu believed quite the opposite: the fact that Buza 
was found “validly arrested on probable cause . . . and was promptly charged with” that offense has 
“[no] bearing on whether it was lawful to require him to provide his DNA before any of those 
determinations were made.” Id. 
 109. Id. at 1158–59. Justice Liu documents the copious leaps and bounds an individual must 
overcome in order to get his DNA sample expunged: “The extensive documentation, notice to 
multiple parties, judicial hearing, and additional steps required for expungement place a significant 
burden on eligible persons, assuming they are even aware of the process.” Id. at 1157. Further, the 
statute also reads, “The court has the discretion to grant or deny the request for expungement. The 
denial of a request for expungement is a nonappealable order . . . .” Id.; CAL. PENAL CODE § 299 
(West 2014). 
 110. Buza, 413 P.3d at 1161. 
 111. Id. 
 112. Id. 
 113. Id. at 1163. 
 114. Id. 
 115. Id. at 1163–78 (Cuéllar, J., dissenting). 
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offered individualized arguments as well. In its most relevant part, 
Justice Cuéllar’s dissent rejected the majority’s holding because it 
failed to consider what role the California Constitution plays in 
determining whether the rights of a California citizen have been 
violated; essentially, the majority “contends that the scope of the 
legitimate privacy rights of persons arrested is no different under [the 
California] constitution than under the Fourth Amendment.”116 
Despite its identical wording to the Fourth Amendment, Justice 
Cuéllar asserted that article I, section 13 of the California Constitution 
provided heightened protections for the privacy rights of individuals, 
including those that have been arrested.117 Justice Cuéllar, though 
acknowledging that Supreme Court decisions deserve “respectful 
consideration,” argued that the California Supreme Court was 
“obligated” to perform an independent analysis regarding whether the 
California Constitution provided protection against the search at 
issue.118 
Justice Cuéllar referred to the court’s summary in Raven v. 
Deukmejian,119 which lists the “numerous decisions” from the 
California Supreme Court where the court interpreted the state 
constitution as extending protections to California citizens beyond 
those assured by the United States Supreme Court under the United 
States Constitution.120 Further, he recognized that within the context 
of search and seizure of arrestees, California has been explicit in 
holding that the state constitution provides greater protection than the 
Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution.121 Justice 
Cuéllar cited to a California Supreme Court case that held that, even 
upon full custodial arrest, booking, and incarceration, police may not 
search an arrestee in the hope of discovering evidence of a more 
serious crime, making clear that arrestees in California enjoy greater 
protections against searches and seizures under the state 
constitution.122 
To offer more support for his argument that the California 
Constitution garners broader privacy protections than the United 
 
 116. Id. 
 117. Id. 
 118. Id. at 1164 (emphasis added). 
 119.  801 P.2d 1077 (Cal. 1990). 
 120. Buza, 413 P.3d at 1165 (citing Raven, 801 P.2d at 1088). 
 121. Id. 
 122. Id. 
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States Constitution, Justice Cuéllar cited to article I, section 1 of the 
California Constitution: “All people are by nature free and 
independent and have inalienable rights. Among these are enjoying 
and defending life and liberty, acquiring, possessing, and protecting 
property, and pursuing and obtaining safety, happiness, and 
privacy.”123 Justice Cuéllar noted that article I does not create a 
separate class of privacy rights but argued that, at a minimum, it 
“underscores how certain infringements of personal privacy deserve 
heightened scrutiny in our search and seizure analysis relative to what 
the federal analysis requires.”124 
After “assign[ing] proper weight and meaning to the California 
Constitution,” Justice Cuéllar argued that the search in question was 
not reasonable.125 First, Justice Cuéllar criticized the governmental 
“need” to create a DNA profile of an arrestee for the purpose of 
“identification.”126 Justice Cuéllar discussed that fingerprinting is a 
much quicker and less-intrusive means of providing identification 
information.127 Therefore, Justice Cuéllar found it unlikely that 
“identification” was truly the interest the government sought to 
further.128 Instead, Justice Cuéllar said, “[T]he most plausible 
justification for the present DNA collection is that it aids in identifying 
arrestees who may have been perpetrators of unsolved crimes.”129 
Though solving crimes can certainly constitute a legitimate 
government interest, that interest is not sufficient to overcome the 
privacy rights of arrestees.130 Citing to Ingersoll v. Palmer,131 Justice 
Cuéllar noted that the law requires the government to have 
individualized suspicion that an individual has committed a specific 
offense for the search or seizure to be valid.132  
Justice Cuéllar also disapproved of the majority’s assertion that 
Buza did not have a right to challenge the scope of the collection 
 
 123. Id. at 1167; see also CAL. CONST. art. I, § 1 (“All people are by nature free and independent 
and have inalienable rights.”). 
 124. Buza, 413 P.3d at 1167. 
 125. Id. at 1178. 
 126. Id. at 1169. 
 127. On average, a DNA profile takes about thirty days to complete. On the contrary, law 
enforcement officials can collect fingerprints, compare them against a database, and obtain a 
response as to any identification “hits” within approximately twenty-seven minutes. Id. 
 128. See id. 
 129. Id. at 1170. 
 130. See id. at 1169. 
 131.  743 P.2d 1299 (Cal. 1987). 
 132. Buza, 413 P.3d at 1170 (citing Ingersoll, 743 P.2d at 1303–04). 
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requirement in the DNA Act.133 At the time Buza refused to provide a 
DNA sample, he (should have) “enjoyed the presumption of 
innocence” because the disposition of his felony charges were 
uncertain; as such, Buza had every right to challenge the DNA Act as 
an arrestee who could eventually be acquitted of felony charges.134 
Justice Cuéllar warned that failure to reach this issue meant that a 
“future plaintiff [would] suffer irreversible adverse consequences.”135 
Finally, Justice Cuéllar argued that the DNA Act merited a 
different constitutional analysis than what was required for the 
Maryland law in King.136 Unlike the Maryland law, the DNA Act does 
not require that a lawful arrest have occurred before DNA 
collection.137 Additionally, though the Maryland DNA collection law 
provides for automatic expungement and destruction of DNA if the 
individual is not convicted of a felony, the California DNA Act does 
not.138 
In conclusion, Justice Cuéllar argued that, under the California 
Constitution, arrestees are accorded a higher expectation of privacy 
than under the United States Constitution.139 “[W]hen weighed against 
the State’s generalized interest in identifying arrestees and solving 
crimes, an arrestee’s reasonable privacy interest in his or her genetic 
information—uniquely protected under the California Constitution—
must win.”140 
 
 133. See id. 
 134. Id. 
 135. Id. Indeed, the majority recognized that “we must leave for another day” the question of 
whether automatic expungement is constitutionally required for the wrongly arrested or exonerated. 
Id. at 1146 (majority opinion). 
 136. See id. at 1176 (Cuéllar, J., dissenting). 
 137. To the contrary, the DNA Act allows for retrieval and processing of a DNA sample before 
a judicial officer has determined that the arrest was valid. Id. In Maryland, a DNA sample may not 
be taken until the arrestee has been arraigned. Id. at 1142 (majority opinion). Additionally, nearly 
one in five felony arrestees are released prior to a judicial determination of probable cause; 
however, such arrestees are still required to allow their DNA to be collected and retained for at 
least 180 days. Id. at 1176 (Cuéllar, J., dissenting) (“[T]he Department of Justice shall destroy a 
specimen and sample and expunge the searchable DNA database profile pertaining to the person 
who has no present or past qualifying offense of record upon receipt of order that verifies the 
applicant has made the necessary showing at a noticed hearing, and that includes . . . [a] court order 
verifying that no retrial or appeal of the case is pending, that it has been at least 180 days . . . .”); 
see also CAL. PENAL CODE § 299(c)(2)(D) (West 2014). 
 138. Buza, 413 P.3d at 1145 (majority opinion). 
 139. See id. at 1163, 1165 (Cuéllar, J., dissenting). 
 140. Id. at 1177. 
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IV.  HISTORICAL FRAMEWORK 
A.  California Constitutionalism and Criminal Procedure 
The California Constitution is one of the longest in the world.141 
The length of California’s Constitution is largely due to additions by 
California ballot propositions and voter initiatives.142 A number of the 
provisions of the California Constitution are identical to those of the 
United States Constitution.143 Nevertheless, an interpretation by the 
United States Supreme Court of a provision of the United States 
Constitution does not mean that a similarly—or identically—worded 
provision of the California Constitution must necessarily be 
interpreted in the same manner, particularly where the history, past 
interpretation, or intent of the state constitutional provision supports a 
more expansive reading.144 For example, in his dissent in Michigan v. 
Mosley,145 Justice Brennan observed that “[e]ach [s]tate has power to 
impose higher standards governing police practices under state law 
than is required by the United States Constitution.”146 
In combination, Justice Liu’s and Justice Cuéllar’s dissents argue 
that the California Constitution protects individual rights broadly and 
beyond those rights provided by the United States Constitution. This 
doctrine, state constitutionalism, has also been referred to as the “new 
judicial federalism.”147 During the Warren Court years, both the 
federal and California high courts expanded criminal procedure 
rights.148 State constitutionalism emerged during the early 1970s when 
the Warren Court gave way to that of Chief Justice Burger, and was 
 
 141. BRIAN P. JANISKEE & KEN MASUGI, DEMOCRACY IN CALIFORNIA: POLITICS AND 
GOVERNMENT IN THE GOLDEN STATE 27 (2d ed. 2008). 
 142. Tani Cantil-Sakauye, Foreword to JOSEPH R. GRODIN, ET AL., THE CALIFORNIA STATE 
CONSTITUTION xxiii, xxv–xxvi (G. Alan Tarr ed., 2nd ed. 2016) (“Many commentators have 
observed the relative ease by which the California Constitution can be amended through the 
initiative process and have accurately highlighted how this unusual attribute of our state 
constitutional structure has expanded our state constitution.”). 
 143. Compare CAL. CONST. (laying out the legislative, executive, and judicial branches of the 
state government in articles IV–VI), with U.S. CONST. (similarly laying out the legislative, 
executive, and judicial branches of the federal government in articles I–III). 
 144. Cantil-Sakauye, supra note 142, at xxv. 
 145.  423 U.S. 96 (1975). 
 146. Id. at 120 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
 147. G. ALAN TARR, UNDERSTANDING STATE CONSTITUTIONS 161 (1998). 
 148. David Aram Kaiser & David A. Carrillo, California Constitutional Law, Reanimating 
Criminal Procedure Rights After the “Other” Proposition 8, 56 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 33, 34 
(2016). 
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vehemently supported by Justice Brennan.149 In fact, Justice Brennan 
wrote in 1986, “Rediscovery by state supreme courts of the broader 
protections afforded their own citizens by their state constitution . . . 
is probably the most important development in constitutional 
jurisprudence in our time.”150 
When Chief Justice Burger’s tenure on the Supreme Court began, 
Justice Brennan called on state high courts to hold onto the steps taken 
to broaden criminal procedure jurisprudence by basing constitutional 
rulings on state constitutions, which could potentially provide broader 
protections than those provided by the United States Constitution.151 
Historically, California was a progressive leader in developing 
individual rights under the California Constitution.152 In particular, the 
California Supreme Court was a frontrunner in expanding rights 
regarding state criminal procedure.153 
In 1955, the California Supreme Court applied the exclusionary 
rule to evidence that had been illegally obtained by the government.154 
In People v. Wheeler,155 the California Supreme Court held that a 
prosecutor’s racially-biased use of peremptory strikes of potential 
jurors violated the state constitutional right to be tried by a fair and 
impartial jury.156 In Wheeler, the court refused to follow the contrary 
federal rule set forth in Swain v. Alabama.157 In other cases, the 
 
 149. Id.; see also William J. Brennan, Jr., State Constitutions and the Protection of Individual 
Rights, 90 HARV. L. REV. 489, 502 (1977) (“Every believer in our concept of federalism, and I am 
a devout believer, must salute this development in our state courts.”). 
 150. Robert F. Williams, Justice Brennan, The New Jersey Supreme Court, and State 
Constitutions: The Evolution of a State Constitutional Consciousness, 29 RUTGERS L.J. 763, 763 
(1998). 
 151. Kaiser & Carrillo, supra note 148, at 34. 
 152. DAVID A. CARRILLO, GOVERNING CALIFORNIA: POLITICS, GOVERNMENT, AND PUBLIC 
POLICY IN THE GOLDEN STATE 301–02 (Ethan Rarick ed., 3d ed. 2013). 
 153. See Kevin M. Mulcahy, Modeling the Garden: How New Jersey Built the Most 
Progressive State Supreme Court and What California Can Learn, 40 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 863, 
884–87 (2000). 
 154. People v. Cahan, 282 P.2d 905, 911 (Cal. 1955). This California Supreme Court decision 
came six years before the United States Supreme Court applied the federal exclusionary rule against 
the states in Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 660 (1961). 
 155. 583 P.2d 748 (Cal. 1978). 
 156. Id. at 766. 
 157. 380 U.S. 202 (1965); see Wheeler, 583 P.2d at 767–77; see also Swain v. Alabama, 380 
U.S. 202 (1965) (The court stated it saw “no reason, except for blind application of a proof standard 
developed in a context where there is no question of state responsibility for the alleged 
exclusion, why the defendant attacking the prosecutor’s systematic use of challenges against 
Negroes should not be required to establish on the record the prosecutor’s conduct in this regard, 
especially where the same prosecutor for many years is said to be responsible for this practice and 
is quite available for questioning on this matter.”). 
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California Supreme Court continued to expand the protections 
afforded to individuals against warrantless searches and seizures in 
ways that went far beyond what was required by the United States 
Constitution.158 
In each of the above cases, the California Supreme Court 
interpreted the guarantees of the California Constitution “without 
according any deference or presumption of correctness to high court 
precedent.”159 In his dissent, Justice Liu noted that “on each of these 
issues, the high court eventually overruled its precedent and adopted 
as a matter of federal law the rule we had adopted as a matter of state 
law.”160 However, in 1982, California’s historical “progressiveness” 
was dismantled, and the scale of criminal procedural law tilted toward 
crime control.161 
B.  The End of California Constitutionalism 
California’s progressive approach to criminal procedure has 
drawn extensive criticism and calls for reform.162 Additionally, not all 
California courts agreed with the high court’s use of the independent 
state grounds doctrine to avoid the United States Supreme Court 
rulings.163 As a result, opponents of California’s broad criminal 
procedure protections turned to the California Constitution, article II, 
section 8 to remove individual rights by initiative. Because of these 
initiatives, California is now unique for providing no state 
 
 158. See generally People v. Brisendine, 531 P.2d 1009, 1009 (Cal. 1975) (holding that police 
officers cannot subject a motorist to a full body and vehicle search unless the officer has articulable 
reasons to suspect other illegal conduct); People v. Norman, 538 P.2d 237, 238 (Cal. 1975) (holding 
that where defendant’s arrest could only have been for violation of traffic laws and there was no 
evidence providing probable cause, seizure was unlawful); Burrows v. Superior Court, 529 P.2d 
590, 590 (Cal. 1974) (ruling that examination of one’s bank records violates the state constitutional 
right to privacy). 
 159. People v. Buza, 413 P.3d 1132, 1162 (Cal. 2018) (Liu, J., dissenting). 
 160. Id. 
 161. Kaiser & Carrillo, supra note 148, at 37. 
 162. See, e.g., John K. Van de Kamp & Richard W. Gerry, Reforming the Exclusionary Rule: 
An Analysis of Two Proposed Amendments to the California Constitution, 33 HASTINGS L.J. 1109, 
1110–11 (1982). 
 163. See People v. Lance W. (In re Lance W.), 197 Cal. Rptr. 331, 335 (1983) (stating that there 
is a “history of the decades long debate that has focused on the efficacy of . . . state’s use of the 
doctrine of independent state grounds to avoid the impact of federal high court decisions in the 
Fourth Amendment area”), vacated, 694 P.2d 744 (Cal. 1985); see also People v. Norman, 538 
P.2d 237, 246 (Cal. 1975) (“A sudden switch to a California ground to avoid the impact of federal 
high court decisions invites the successful use of the initiative process to overrule the California 
decision with its concomitant harm to the prestige, influence, and function of the judicial branch of 
state government.”). 
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constitutional protection to its citizens, beyond that required by the 
United States Constitution, in the majority of the areas of 
constitutional criminal procedure. 
In 1982, California advanced its war on crime when citizens 
passed into law Proposition 8’s Right to Truth-in-Evidence 
provision.164 Proposition 8, known also as the Victim’s Bill of Rights, 
added section 28 to article I of the California Constitution and 
introduced a “Right to Truth-in-Evidence.”165 The Right to Truth-in-
Evidence provision provided that, absent a few exceptions, “relevant 
evidence shall not be excluded in any criminal proceeding.”166 As a 
result, section 28 abrogated numerous judicially-created rules that 
previously excluded certain evidence seized as a violation of a 
defendant’s constitutional rights.167 Essentially, Proposition 8 
severely limited an individual’s search and seizure exclusionary rule 
rights under the California Constitution to no more than what is 
required by the federal government.168 
In In re Lance W.,169 the Truth-in-Evidence provision of 
Proposition 8 faced its first significant constitutional challenge 
regarding searches and seizures.170 Prior to passing Proposition 8, 
California case decisions required the exclusion of evidence obtained 
in violation of the search and seizure provisions of the California 
Constitution “under circumstances in which the evidence would be 
admissible under federal constitutional principles.”171 One question 
 
 164. See Hank M. Goldberg, The Impact of Proposition 8 on Prior Misconduct Impeachment 
Evidence in California Criminal Cases, 24 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 621, 621 (1991). 
 165. CAL. CONST. art. I, § 28(f)(2). 
 166. Id. 
 167. See id.; see also In re Lance W., 694 P.2d at 747 (“Approaching Proposition 8 in that spirit, 
we conclude that Proposition 8 has abrogated both the ‘vicarious exclusionary rule’ under which a 
defendant had standing to object to the introduction of evidence seized in violation of the rights of 
a third person, and a defendant’s right to object to and suppress evidence seized in violation of the 
California, but not the federal, Constitution.”). 
 168. See generally In re Lance W., 694 P.2d at 747 (holding that “[p]roposition 8 has abrogated 
both the ‘vicarious exclusionary rule’ under which a defendant has standing to object to the 
introduction of evidence seized in violation of the rights of a third person, and a defendant’s right 
to object to and suppress evidence seized in violation of the California but not the federal, 
Constitution”). 
 169. 694 P.2d 744 (Cal. 1985). 
 170. See id. at 747; see also Randall A. Cohen & Mark D. Klein, Proposition 8: California Law 
After In re Lance W. and People v. Castro, 12 PEPP. L. REV. 1059, 1080 (1985) (“The California 
Supreme Court has, for the first time, in the case of In re Lance W., unequivocally recognized that 
the doctrine of independent state grounds as it relates to the admissibility of evidence in a criminal 
trial is no longer valid.”). 
 171. In re Lance W., 694 P.2d at 747. 
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posed in In re Lance W., therefore, was whether any right to suppress 
evidence under the California Constitution survived beyond the 
minimum rights guaranteed by the United States Constitution.172 
The court in In re Lance W. concluded that “Proposition 8 . . . 
eliminate[d] a judicially created remedy for violations of the search 
and seizure provisions of the federal or state Constitutions, through the 
exclusion of evidence so obtained, except to the extent that exclusion 
remains federally compelled.”173 This meant that illegally-obtained 
evidence that would have normally been excluded under the California 
Constitution would now be admissible evidence unless federal law 
dictated otherwise. This holding represented a significant departure 
from California’s broader exclusionary rule and general search and 
seizure protections. 
After the ruling in In re Lance W., the California legislature 
proposed another proposition that threatened California 
constitutionalism. In 1990, Californians approved Proposition 115, 
which read, “Amends state Constitution regarding criminal and 
juvenile cases: affords accused no greater constitutional rights than 
federal Constitution affords.”174 The California Supreme Court 
abrogated Proposition 115 as an unconstitutional restriction on the 
court’s ability to interpret the California Constitution.175 The court in 
Raven struck down this addition to article I, section 24 of the 
California Constitution as “a constitutional revision beyond the scope 
of the initiative process.”176 
Effectively, the Raven court reaffirmed the role of state 
constitutionalism. Similar to the majority in Buza, the Raven court 
acknowledged that the California Supreme Court has often deferred to 
the United States Supreme Court when interpreting identical language 
found in the federal and state constitutions;177 however, the court in 
Raven appropriately held that it would be improper for the California 
Supreme Court to mandate state courts’ “blind obedience” to United 
 
 172. Id. 
 173. Id. at 752. 
 174. California Proposition 115, the “Crime Victims Justice Reform Act” (1990), 
BALLOTPEDIA, https://ballotpedia.org/California_Proposition_115,_the_%22Crime_Victims_ 
Justice_Reform_Act%22_(1990) (last visited Dec. 8, 2019); see CAL. CONST. art. I, § 30(b) 
(enacted by Proposition 115). 
 175. Raven v. Deukmejian, 801 P.2d 1077, 1078 (Cal. 1990). 
 176. Id. at 1086. 
 177. Id. at 1088. 
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States Supreme Court decisions, despite the existence of “cogent 
reasons,” “independent state interests,” or “strong countervailing 
circumstances” supporting a departure from the highest court’s 
rulings.178 
V.  ANALYSIS 
In People v. Buza, the majority failed to consider the “cogent 
reasons” and “independent state interests” that should have led the 
court to construe California’s identically-worded constitutional 
language differently from the United States Constitution. Despite the 
general rule that deference should be given to higher court rulings, 
California courts have the authority to adopt an independent 
interpretation of the California Constitution, even if its language is 
identical to that of the United States Constitution.179 
The Buza majority failed to recognize the significant differences 
between the Maryland law and California’s DNA Act. By failing to 
recognize those differences, the court fell into a deferential trap, 
missed the opportunity to reassert California’s independent 
constitutionalism, and blindly relied upon the arguments provided by 
the Supreme Court in Maryland v. King. 
A.  The California DNA Act Warranted a Different Constitutional 
Analysis Than That Applied in King 
Because the Maryland DNA collection law substantially differs 
from California’s DNA Act, a different constitutional analysis was 
warranted when reviewing the constitutionality of the DNA Act. 
Considering the substantial differences between the Maryland law and 
the California law, California’s DNA Act violates both the United 
States Constitution and the California Constitution. 
While California’s DNA collection statute is similar in many 
ways to the Maryland law that was upheld in King, there are three 
significant differences. First, the DNA Act applies to a broader 
category of arrestees than the Maryland law.180 Second, unlike the 
Maryland law, the DNA Act authorizes both DNA collection and 
testing before charges are filed and before a finding of probable 
 
 178. Id. 
 179. Id. 
 180. People v. Buza, 413 P.3d 1132, 1141 (Cal. 2018). 
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cause.181 Finally, unlike the Maryland law, California’s DNA Act does 
not provide for automatic destruction of the DNA sample if the 
arrestee is cleared of the crime.182 
Of these three differences, the second is the most significant when 
analyzing the constitutionality of the DNA Act. The Maryland DNA 
Collection Act applies only to arrestees who are already in valid police 
custody for a serious offense supported by probable cause.183 In 
contrast, California’s DNA Act applies to all felony arrestees (and 
some misdemeanant arrestees), regardless of whether or not their 
arrest was supported by probable cause.184 This raises a number of 
legal and ethical issues, the biggest issue being whether or not such a 
law violates an individual’s right to be free from unreasonable 
searches and seizures. 
1.  California’s DNA Act Violates the Fourth Amendment to the 
United States Constitution 
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution 
provides, in pertinent part: “The right of the people to be secure in 
their persons, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and 
seizures, shall not be violated.”185 It is well established that collection 
of DNA samples is a search within the meaning of the Fourth 
Amendment and that, as a general rule, a warrantless search or a search 
without individualized suspicion is usually unreasonable.186 As the 
majority in both King and Buza recognize, the “touchstone of the 
Fourth Amendment is reasonableness.”187 
The King majority relied on Illinois v. McArthur,188 which noted 
that individualized suspicion is not categorically required: “In some 
circumstances, such as ‘[w]hen faced with special law enforcement 
needs, diminished expectations of privacy, minimal intrusions, or the 
like, the Court has found that certain general, or individual, 
circumstances may render a warrantless search or seizure 
 
 181. Id. 
 182. Id. 
 183. Maryland v. King, 569 U.S. 435, 447–48 (2013). 
 184. See generally Appellant’s Answer Brief on the Merits, supra note 53, at 71, 95 (“But, in 
California, both collection and submission of the DNA occurs immediately following arrest, prior 
to any judicial review of probable cause and even prior to any prosecutorial charging decision.”). 
 185. U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
 186. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967). 
 187. King, 569 U.S. at 448; Buza, 413 P.3d at 1140. 
 188. 531 U.S. 326 (2001). 
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reasonable.”189 The Buza majority deferred to the reasoning in King 
that a cheek swab of an arrestee at the time of booking falls into the 
category of “routine searches” that is justified by “special law 
enforcement needs.”190 Interestingly, the King Court failed to identify 
and explain what constitutes “special law enforcement needs.”191 
Special law enforcement needs, however, reflect that the need must 
always be justified by concerns “other than crime detection.”192 
In King, the Court relied on a balancing test to decide whether or 
not the search was reasonable under the Fourth Amendment.193 
According to case precedent, such a balancing test is appropriate when 
“the need for a warrant is greatly diminished”—for instance, when an 
arrestee is already in valid police custody for a serious offense 
supported by probable cause.194 Such an argument makes sense in 
King’s case, where the applicable Maryland DNA collection statute 
applies only to those that have been charged with serious crimes 
supported by probable cause. 
In cases such as Buza’s, where the applicable California DNA 
statute is triggered “immediately following arrest” before probable 
cause is determined, the reasonableness balancing test is ineffectual. 
Of course, there is a legitimate government interest in identifying 
arrestees and protecting the safety of law enforcement officials that 
are tasked with processing and handling said arrestees. Regardless, 
that governmental interest should not open the door to invasive genetic 
testing when there are alternative methods for identification that are 
less of an intrusion of privacy. Even more troublesome is the State’s 
use of the arrestee’s DNA for crime-solving purposes. Though there 
is a “closely guarded category of constitutionally permissible 
suspicionless searches,”195 that category has never included searches 
designed to serve “the normal need for law enforcement.”196 
 
 189. King, 569 U.S. at 447 (quoting McArthur, 531 U.S. at 330). 
 190. Buza, 413 P.3d at 1140. 
 191. See King, 569 U.S. at 447 (“In some circumstances, such as ‘[w]hen faced with special 
law enforcement needs, diminished expectations of privacy, minimal intrusions, or the like, the 
Court has found that certain general, or individual, circumstances may render a warrantless search 
or seizure reasonable.’”). 
 192. Chandler v. Miller, 520 U.S. 305, 313–14 (1997). 
 193. King, 569 U.S. at 448. 
 194. Id. at 436 (citing Samson v. California, 547 U.S. 843, 855 (2006)). 
 195. Chandler, 520 U.S. at 309. 
 196. Skinner v. Ry. Labor Execs.’ Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602, 619 (1989). 
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The legislative purpose of California’s DNA Act is clear: the Act 
serves as an investigative tool, not an identification tool.197 Proponents 
of the DNA Act promised that it would help “solve crimes, free those 
wrongfully accused, and stop serial killers.”198 Likewise, the findings 
section of the proposed law declared that it would “solve crime[s],” 
“apprehend perpetrators,” expand the number of “cold hits and 
criminal investigation links,” and thereby “substantially reduce the 
number of unsolved crimes.”199 As previously mentioned, the very 
first subsection under Proposition 69’s Declaration of Purpose reads, 
“Our communities have a compelling interest in protecting themselves 
from crime.”200 Though identification of arrestees is mentioned as one 
of the legislative purposes of Proposition 69, it is certainly not the end 
goal.201 
It is unclear why the California Court of Appeal did not revisit the 
Fourth Amendment question when Buza was remanded to be 
reconsidered in light of King.202 In its pre-remand opinion, the 
California Court of Appeal made convincing arguments that the DNA 
Act does in fact violate arrestees’ Fourth Amendment rights.203 The 
California Court of Appeal distinguished a number of cases in which 
the United States Supreme Court upheld warrantless searches and 
seizures, and emphasized that each of those cases involved defendants 
that had already been indicted or convicted.204 
The California Court of Appeal fully appreciated the statutory 
scheme of the DNA Act and noted the high court’s indifference to the 
 
 197. Proposition 69 (DNA), supra note 1. 
 198. CAL. SEC’Y OF STATE, VOTER INFORMATION GUIDE FOR 2004, GENERAL ELECTION 62 
(2004), https://repository.uchastings.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2236&context=ca_ballot_ 
props. 
 199. Id. at 135. 
 200. CAL. SEC’Y OF STATE, supra note 17. 
 201. Proposition 69’s Declarations of Purpose later mentions that “[l]aw enforcement should 
be able to use the DNA Database and Data Bank Program to substantially reduce the number of 
unsolved crimes . . . .” Id. 
 202. After the ruling in King, the California Court of Appeal arguably could have still 
distinguished Buza’s case on federal constitutional grounds based on the differences between the 
Maryland and California statutes. See Maryland v. King, 569 U.S, 435, 447–48 (2013); People v. 
Buza, 180 Cal. Rptr. 3d 753, 763 (Ct. App. 2014), rev’d, 413 P.3d 1132 (Cal. 2018). 
 203. See generally Buza, 180 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 795 (“It has been stated, with respect to the federal 
Constitution, that because ‘[t]he interests in human dignity and privacy which the Fourth 
Amendment protects forbid any such intrusion on the mere chance that desired evidence might be 
obtained’ . . . ‘the mere fact that law enforcement may be made more efficient can never by itself 
justify disregard of the Fourth Amendment.’”). 
 204. Id. at 763. 
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“second search” that occurs under the DNA Act, when the DNA 
sample is analyzed and a profile is created for use in state and federal 
DNA databases.205 This part, the court argued, should be the true focus 
of the Fourth Amendment analysis.206 The California Court of Appeal 
rightfully found that there was no non-law enforcement reason for 
creating a DNA profile with an arrestee’s cheek swab.207 Because the 
special needs exception to the warrant requirement did not apply, and 
because no other exception to the warrant requirement applied, 
individualized suspicion was required.208 Because there was no 
individualized suspicion in Buza’s case, the search was 
unreasonable.209 
2.  California’s DNA Act Violates Article I, Section 13 of the 
California Constitution 
Article I, section 13 of the California Constitution provides, in 
essentially identical language to the United States Constitution: “The 
right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and 
effects against unreasonable seizures and searches may not be 
violated . . . .”210 Regardless of its nearly identical language, “the 
California Constitution is, and has always been, ‘a document of 
independent force’ that sets forth rights that are in no way ‘dependent 
on those guaranteed by the United States Constitution.’ (Cal. Const., 
art. I, § 24).”211 Though the Buza majority affirmed the independence 
of California’s Constitution, it failed to consider whether there existed 
any cogent reasons, independent state interests, or strong 
countervailing circumstances that would have supported a finding that 
California’s DNA Act violates the California Constitution.212 
On various prior occasions, the California Supreme Court has 
decided questions pertaining to the legality of searches and seizures 
solely under article I, section 13 of the California Constitution when 
the United State Supreme Court had not yet decided the parallel 
question under the Fourth Amendment.213 It is a plausible argument 
 
 205. Id. at 762–63. 
 206. Id. 
 207. Id. at 766–68. 
 208. Id. at 775. 
 209. Id. 795–96. 
 210. CAL. CONST. art. I, § 13. 
 211. People v. Buza, 413 P.3d 1132, 1148 (Cal. 2018) (citations omitted). 
 212. Id. 
 213. See, e.g., People v. Ruggles, 702 P.2d 170, 175–76 (Cal. 1985). 
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that King and Buza presented similar, if not identical, legal questions 
as they pertained to the Fourth Amendment analysis.214 Regardless, 
the Buza majority erred when it evaluated the “constitutionality of 
searches and seizures under our state Constitution by employing the 
same mode of analysis that the high court applied in King.”215 The 
Buza court improperly relied on the reasoning of the King Court, 
which construed a different statute and a different constitution.216 
The California Constitution extends protections to its citizens 
beyond those provided in the federal context.217 The California 
Constitution provides heightened protections for the privacy rights of 
individuals, even arrestees.218 For example, the California Supreme 
Court held that “the search of [an arrestee’s] person beyond the scope 
of a pat-down was unlawful under article I, section 13 of the California 
Constitution.”219 In search and seizure cases, the California Supreme 
Court has “require[d] a more exacting standard” for cases arising in 
the state.220 Even full custodial arrest, booking, and incarceration do 
not authorize a warrantless search of a person.221 
Additionally, in contrast to the United States Constitution, the 
California Constitution contains an express statement about the 
importance of personal privacy: “All people are by nature free and 
independent and have inalienable rights. Among these are . . . 
pursuing and obtaining . . . privacy.”222 Though courts have not found 
that article I, section 1 confers an independent right to privacy separate 
 
 214. In both cases the issue was whether the Fourth Amendment prohibits the collection and 
analysis of a DNA sample from persons arrested for, but not yet convicted of, felony charges. See 
Buza, 413 P.3d at 1135; see also Maryland v. King, 569 U.S. 435 (2013) (holding that “when 
officers make an arrest supported by probable cause to hold for a serious offense and bring the 
suspect to the station to be detained in custody, taking and analyzing a cheek swab of the arrestee’s 
DNA is, like fingerprinting and photographing, a legitimate police booking procedure that is 
reasonable under the Fourth Amendment”). 
 215. Buza, 413 P.3d at 1148. Additionally, “[t]hough the United States Supreme Court may 
have reached a different conclusion when evaluating another state’s DNA collection statute under 
the federal Constitution, the role of our state charter, the unique importance it assigns to privacy, 
and the differences between the statute[s]” suggest that the Buza court should have found the Act 
unconstitutional. Id. at 1164 (Cuéllar, J., dissenting). 
 216. Id.  
 217. Raven v. Deukmejian, 801 P.2d 1077, 1088 (Cal. 1990) (listing the “numerous decisions” 
from the California Supreme Court “interpreting the state Constitution as extending protection to 
our citizens beyond the limits imposed by the high court”). 
 218. Buza, 413 P.3d at 1163. 
 219. People v. Maher, 550 P.2d 1044, 1046 (1976). 
 220. Buza, 413 P.3d at 1165 (citing People v. Brisendine, 531 P.2d 1009, 1099 (Cal. 1975)). 
 221. Id. (citing People v. Laiwa, 669 P.2d 1278, 1278 (Cal. 1983)). 
 222. CAL. CONST. art. I, § 1. 
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from article I, section 13, courts have neither found that the language 
is devoid of meaning.223 At a minimum, this addition to California’s 
Constitution underscores the importance the state places on citizens’ 
privacy rights. 
Finally, in deciding whether the California Constitution provides 
protection against the search and seizure in Buza, the court was 
obligated to perform an independent analysis.224 Instead, the Buza 
majority mistakenly relied on the holding in King, even for its analysis 
under the California Constitution.225 Because of the California 
Supreme Court’s precedent regarding the protections afforded to 
arrestees, and because of the California Constitution’s explicit privacy 
protection, the Buza court should have engaged in an independent 
analysis of California’s DNA Act. 
B.  A Missed Opportunity 
In the majority opinion, Justice Kruger conceded that California’s 
DNA Act “may raise additional constitutional questions that will 
require resolution in other cases.”226 Nevertheless, the majority opted 
not to explore Buza’s argument that the DNA Act is facially 
unconstitutional as applied to other arrestees.227 The majority opinion, 
written by usually-liberal-voting Justice Kruger,228 missed a huge 
opportunity to reassert California’s seemingly-forgotten 
constitutionalism. 
The Buza majority declined to address an issue that it could and 
should have: whether it is constitutional to require a DNA sample to 
be taken and analyzed after an arrest but before a finding of probable 
 
 223. Buza, 413 P.3d at 1167. 
 224. People v. Teresinski, 640 P.2d 753, 760–761 (Cal. 1982) (“[T]he California courts, in 
interpreting the constitution of this state, are not bound by federal precedent construing the parallel 
federal text . . . [T]he ‘state courts, in interpreting constitutional guarantees contained in the 
constitutions, are “independently responsible for safeguarding the rights of their citizens.”’”). 
 225. The court analyzed the constitutionality of searches and seizures under the California 
Constitution by employing the same mode of analysis that the high court applied in King. Buza, 
413 P.3d at 1148 (majority opinion). 
 226. Id. at 1155. 
 227. Id. (citing People v. Contreras, 411 P.3d 445, 463 (Cal. 2018)) (“We accordingly abide by 
what has been called a ‘cardinal principle of judicial restraint—if it is not necessary to decide more, 
it is not necessary to decide more.’”). 
 228. Justice Kruger, who normally delivers a liberal-leaning vote, played the tie-breaking role 
in the Buza opinion. It was Justice Kruger who did not deliver the fourth liberal vote that would 
have gained the dissenting justices the majority. See David Aram Kaiser, Opinion Analysis: People 
v. Buza, SCOCA BLOG (Aug. 29, 2018), http://scocablog.com/opinion-analysis-people-v-buza/. 
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cause has been made.229 As mentioned above, the most important 
distinction between California’s DNA Act and the Maryland DNA 
Collection Act is that the DNA Act allows DNA to be taken and 
analyzed prior to a probable cause finding for the arrest, whereas the 
Maryland law applies only to arrestees who are already in custody for 
an offense supported by probable cause.230 By refusing to reach the 
constitutional question posed above, the Buza majority essentially 
eliminated any significant difference between California’s DNA Act 
and Maryland’s DNA Collection Act. In doing so, the majority re-
framed the constitutional issues of the case, which resulted in the 
majority and dissents disagreeing about crucial points and missing 
many of the arguments regarding California constitutionalism. 
Both Justice Liu and Justice Cuéllar made arguments in their 
dissents that the majority opinion failed to respect California’s 
constitutional independence.231 Heavily focusing on California 
constitutionalism, Justice Cuéllar’s dissent read like the majority that 
could have been. Justice Cuéllar outlined a state-specific history for a 
broader constitutional right to privacy under the California 
Constitution than is found in the United States Constitution.232 He 
reminded the majority that the “core value” of article I, section 1 of 
the California Constitution was protecting so-called “informational 
privacy,” meaning the privacy interest in sensitive and confidential 
personal information.233 Based on this state-specific history, Justice 
Cuéllar argued that the majority failed “to do justice to the importance 
of state constitutional rights.”234 
The late Justice Stanley Mosk would have appreciated Justice 
Cuéllar’s attempt to reassert and re-analyze California’s independent 
constitutionalism. Justice Mosk used to be the strong voice on the 
 
 229. Buza, 413 P.3d at 1145 (“[W]e again note that defendant raised no such argument in the 
trial court and we decline to decide the constitutional necessity of such a rule in a case in which 
probable cause have never been contested.”). 
 230. Maryland v. King, 569 U.S. 435, 447–48 (2013). 
 231. Buza, 413 P.3d at 1163 (Cuéllar, J., dissenting). 
 232. Indeed, Justice Cuéllar provided a lengthy list of case law supporting his argument that 
California has “been quite explicit in holding that article I, section 13 provides greater protection 
than does the Fourth Amendment.” Id. at 1165. Additionally, Justice Cuéllar noted that article I, 
section 1 of the California Constitution “grew out of the electorate’s fears of ‘increased surveillance 
and data collection activity in contemporary society,’ and was intended to address the potential 
collection, stockpiling, and use of individual’s most personal information in an arbitrary and 
unjustified fashion.” Id. at 1168 (citations omitted). 
 233. Id. at 1168. 
 234. Id. 
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California Supreme Court for criminal procedure rights. As mentioned 
above, California’s state constitutionalism has ebbed and flowed, 
depending on the political make-up of both the United States Supreme 
Court and the California Supreme Court. In addition to the political 
make-up of the courts, Justice Mosk also attributed losses in the field 
of state constitutionalism to “ill-conceived legislative measures 
designed to curtail judicial independence.”235 Indeed, he scathingly 
described ill-conceived legislative measures as “handcuffs on [his] 
court’s wrists.”236 
In light of the now-conservative Supreme Court majority, it is 
more important than ever for California to reassert its independent 
state constitutionalism. The state-specific history giving rise to 
California’s broader privacy rights and criminal procedural rights 
lends credence to an argument supporting a step in the right direction: 
a step toward independent state constitutionalism. The California 
Supreme Court should strive to provide case rulings consistent with 
article I, section 1 of the California Constitution and consistent with 
case precedent that provides the appropriate constitutional safeguards 
to California citizens. 
C.  A Brief Suggestion 
The Buza majority argued that the provisions of the DNA Act are 
reasonable because the Act provides for “identification of 
arrestees.”237 The court conceded that taking DNA serves the same 
purpose as asking an arrestee for his name or asking him to provide 
fingerprints.238 If the true legislative purpose of Proposition 69 is the 
identification and expeditious booking of felony suspects, then why 
not just require felony arrestees to provide only fingerprints upon 
booking? 
As Justice Cuéllar mentioned in his dissent, creating a DNA 
profile and analyzing an arrestee’s DNA can take thirty days to 
 
 235. Stanley Mosk, State Constitutionalism After Warren: Avoiding the Potomac’s Ebb and 
Flow, in DEVELOPMENTS IN STATE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: THE WILLIAMSBURG CONFERENCE 
201, 201 (Bradley D. McGraw ed., 1985). 
 236. Id. 
 237. Buza, 413 P.3d at 1140 (majority opinion) (noting that expeditious identification of the 
individual arrested allows officers to obtain the suspect’s criminal history and decide how to 
proceed based thereon, ensures that persons accused of crimes are available for trial, allows courts 
to assess whether the arrestee should be released on bail, and acts as a tool to free persons 
wrongfully accused for the same offense). 
 238. Id. 
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complete; on the other hand, law enforcement can collect an arrestee’s 
fingerprints, compare them to an electronic database, and retrieve 
identifying information in approximately twenty-seven minutes.239 
Proposition 69 should be amended to reflect this science. An 
appropriate and simple amendment to Proposition 69 would be to 
require a DNA sample only if the felony arrestee refuses to provide 
his fingerprints. Such an amendment would incentivize arrestees to 
provide legitimate identifying information and would not dismantle 
the legislative purpose of Proposition 69. 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
Buza highlights the struggle to balance governmental interests 
and individual privacy expectations. “The tension between the two 
themes—due process and crime control—has never been resolved and 
perhaps never can be. A balance must always be struck. The word 
balance may be unfortunate; it implies stability.”240 
“The California Constitution is not some minor codicil to the 
United States Constitution.”241 The Buza majority, in failing to 
reassert California’s constitutionalism, took a step in the wrong 
direction for criminal procedural laws and constitutional interpretation 
in general in California. The court refused an important opportunity to 
re-ignite the Mosk-era progressivity and instead rolled over and 
allowed the ruling of the emerging conservative-majority United 
States Supreme Court to take hold. The Buza court had an opportunity 
to put an end to the genetic fishing expeditions made possible by 
Proposition 69 and, unfortunately, missed that mark. 
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